Minnesota Supreme Court rules on trans powerlifter’s discrimination claims

The Minnesota Supreme Court on Oct. 22 issued a ruling in a case brought by JayCee Cooper, a transgender woman, challenging the refusal of USA Powerlifting to allow her to participate as a woman in powerlifting competitions in the Women’s Division of USA Powerlifting. Cooper sued in state court under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), which forbids discrimination on the basis of gender identity by “public accommodations” and in business dealings. At the time this dispute arose, the MHRA did not directly mention gender identity or transgender status, but described the ban on discrimination because of sexual orientation as including “having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one’s biological maleness or femaleness.”  Cooper’s initial complaint was filed with the Human Rights Department in 2021. The statute was amended in 2023 to specifically list gender identity as a forbidden basis for discrimination. Throughout this litigation, the earlier version of the statute that was in effect in 2021 was the applicable source of law, but all parties have agreed that the descriptive language in the definition of sexual orientation brings discrimination against transgender people under the statute’s coverage. This is not a federal case because federal public accommodations laws do not forbid discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity, and since USA Powerlifting is not a governmental entity, it is not subject to federal constitutional discrimination law under the Equal Protection Clause of the US Constitution. When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was pending in Congress, a floor amendment added “sex” to the prohibited grounds of discrimination in Title VII, the employment title, but no such amendment was made in the public accommodations title. The Equality Act, which has been pending in Congress for many years, would add “sex” to the public accommodations provision, but it has failed to win approval in both houses of Congress during the same term. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision is complicated because the legal analysis differs between claims brought under the “public accommodations” provision and the “business” provision. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cooper on both statutory claims, ordering USA Powerlifting to allow her to compete as a woman. The court of appeals reversed, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact related to both claims, so a trial on the facts was necessary, precluding a grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It found that the claim of discrimination in business was subject to a “legitimate business purpose defense,” stating, in the opinion by Chief Justice Natalie Hudson, that “the reasons USA Powerlifting offers for its policy” which categorically disqualifies all transgender women from participating in the women’s competition “give rise to a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether USA Powerlifting’s goal of ensuring fair competition satisfies that defense.” Thus, the grant of summary judgment on the business discrimination claim was inappropriate and that claim needed to be sent back to the trial court to determine the disputed facts. On the other hand, the Supreme Court found that USA Powerlifting’s policy, as stated by its officials (although not a formal written policy at the time this case arose), is “facially discriminatory and constitutes direct evidence of discrimination” under the MHRA. When Cooper applied to compete, she was told that transgender women could not compete in the women’s division, a position that the USA Powerlifting executive committee president stated in a deposition in this case: “The position of the organization was that trans women couldn’t compete in the Women’s division.” Justice Hudson asserts that the “legitimate business purpose defense” does not apply to the MHRA’s ban on discrimination in public accommodations. Thus, Cooper was entitled to summary judgment on the narrow question of whether the policy on its face violates the ban on gender identity discrimination, but a final judgment as to her claim and the remedy she seeks requires the trial court to deal with disputed material facts related to fairness under the business discrimination claim. Cooper’s claim becomes more complicated because of the facts of her individual case. According to Justice Hudson’s opinion, “Cooper was designated male at birth but struggled with her gender identity for years, and was eventually diagnosed with gender dysphoria around 2014, when she was about 26 years old.  Since that time, she has taken spironolactone as part of her treatment for gender dysphoria.” This drug inhibits the production of testosterone and can be part of gender-affirming care for transgender women. But the complicating factor here is that Cooper went through male puberty before she was diagnosed with gender dysphoria, and began transitioning during adulthood. During male puberty, an individual develops physiologically in ways that can be relevant to the issue of fairness in a powerlifting competition, asserts USA Powerlifting, and the looming question in the case is whether Cooper can compete as a woman while taking spironolactone (a treatment that USA Powerlifting lists as prohibited in its drug policy and refused to waive for Cooper), and having obtained advantages in strength associated with male puberty. It also sounds relevant that Cooper “was interested in competing in the women’s open superheavyweight division, the highest women’s weight category, with lifters weighing over approximately 185 pounds.” Despite its stated policy, USA Powerlifting claims it did not exclude Cooper because of her transgender status. The court of appeals, accepting that contention, treated this as a “circumstantial evidence” case rather than a “direct evidence” case, and concluded that USA Powerlifting’s claim that it excluded Cooper because “she has male physiology, which would give her an unfair competitive advantage over athletes with female physiology,” was a non-discriminatory reason for excluding her. The Supreme Court says that there is no escaping that USA Powerlifting’s categorical exclusion of trans women is discriminatory on its face, so “there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cooper’s transgender status actually motivated USA Powerlifting’s decision to prohibit Cooper from competing.” Thus, Cooper was entitled to partial summary judgment as to a violation of the statute, but that doesn’t end the matter because “granting partial summary judgment as to liability for Cooper is only appropriate if there are no statutory defenses or exemptions that are potentially applicable to Cooper’s claims of business discrimination and discrimination in public accommodations.” Discrimination in business claims are subject to the statutory “legitimate business purpose” defense, but such a defense cannot be based on stereotypes about all transgender women.  USA Powerlifting supported its motion for summary judgment by introducing evidence that “transgender women who have gone through male puberty have a significant strength advantage,” but Cooper countered by arguing that letting trans women compete would not “change the nature of the sport of powerlifting, nor would it prevent USA Powerlifting from continuing to host women’s powerlifting events.”  Thus, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether USA Powerlifting has a “legitimate business reason” for excluding transgender women from the women’s division.  Because this defense applies only to the claim of discrimination in business, the Supreme Court affirmed the part of the court of appeals’ decision reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Cooper on her “discrimination in business” claim. However, because the “legitimate business purpose” defense does not apply to the “public accommodations” provision, the Supreme Court said it was wrong for the court of appeals to reverse the partial summary judgement to Cooper on her public accommodations claim. A side issue in the appeal was whether the court should reconsider its 2001 decision in a case involving a transgender employee’s bathroom access claim. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the employer in that case. The court decided there was no reason to address that in this case, because Cooper’s claims did not arise under the employment discrimination provision of the MHRA. The bottom line is that Cooper can keep her summary judgment on public accommodations, but when it comes to a remedy, the issue being sent back to the trial court is whether USA Powerlifting should prevail on its “legitimate business interest” defense under the business discrimination claim. The categorical exclusion may be unlawful, but the refusal to let Cooper compete may turn out to be lawful, and it is up to the trial court to try to sort out the Supreme Court’s less-than-transparent opinion about what happens next. Cooper is represented by a team of Minnesota attorneys from Gender Justice, Nichols Kaster PLLP, and Matthew A. Frank of Minneapolis. The Minnesota Attorney General’s Office participated in support of Cooper on behalf of the Department of Human Rights. Numerous amicus briefs were filed by interested parties, including the ACLU of Minnesota, sports associations and individual athletes, Outfront Minnesota and the Minnesota Lavender Bar Association, among others. There was no dissent from Chief Justice Hudson’s opinion, although one member of the court did not participate in deciding the case. The case cannot be appealed to the US Supreme Court.